What to do under nuclear war how to survive

16 Сен

What to do under nuclear war how to survive

The United States can at any time be hit by nuclear weapons by countries that are powerless in front of them. At least this conclusion is followed from the prevention of the authoritative Western publication. Why is the nuclear catastrophe much more real than sixty years ago, when the USA and the USSR dozens have tested nuclear warboards and tensely «kissed» nuclear shields and swords?

Surrendering the conditional time to the possible nuclear war of the Arrow «Watch of the Judgment Day» moved ahead for another 20 seconds — until 23.58.20, until midnight now «100 seconds». About this a few days ago, the American Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists said. President Rachel Bruson magazine noted that she had never been so close to midnight before the arrows. The world, according to Bronson, is separated from the death «not a clock or even minutes, and countless seconds.»

For a formal basis for such an unprecedented «translation of the shooter», three reasons were immediately. In the information message posted on the website of the magazine Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, these reasons are named by name: the termination of the Agreement on the Elimination of Middle and Less Razines (DRSMD) between the United States and Russia, the strengthening of tension in relations between the United States and Iran and the absence of any Progress on the issue of nuclear disarmament of North Korea.

However, that’s what paradox. Neither North Korea, nor the more Iran, can not seriously threaten the United States — both of these countries have a very limited nuclear potential, and Iran also has no delivery tools that may affect the territory of the United States. So why are scientists now consider the world more dangerous than in the mid-1950s, when the United States and the USSR dozens have tens of nuclear waters?

Speed matters

Let’s start with the way the situation was looking for between 1953 and 1960, when the clock arrows were installed at a position of two minutes from midnight. Then the main means of delivering nuclear weapons were strategic bombers who allowed to strike on the enemy only with a significant interval — several hours from the moment of decision.

Of course, this did not exclude errors that in tragicomic form were shown in the film Stanley Kubrick «Dr. Strajnzhlav, or as I learned to not worry and loved the atomic bomb,» where the American warrior gone from the coils decided to apply a nuclear strike in the USSR. However, both the United States and the USSR had enough time and opportunities for detection and to correct the error.

As a result, the greatest hazard for the stability of mutual nuclear containment is the rapid impact systems. For example, the rockets of medium and smaller range or hiddenly running winged rockets. In the 1980s, the term «dumping time» began to be used in the military-political sphere — that is, from the moment of starting the rocket until the target defeat. The flowing time to Moscow of American Persing-2 missile missiles, placed in their time in Europe, was just a few minutes.

Lessons of the Caribbean Crisis

Interestingly, in the period from 1960 to 1963, the «Judgment Day» shown seven minutes before midnight. Although it was during this period of history that the Caribbean crisis was unfolded in the newest history. At the time of exacerbation of the situation around Cuba, associated with the placement of Soviet missiles of medium-range, the world really was two steps away from the nuclear war. «The watch of the day» then simply did not have time to translate, as the crisis was allowed very quickly, within 38 days, and the acute phase of the crisis of the USSR and the United States and the United States were at all for four days. It was the Caribbean crisis that actually showed how difficult it is to manage nuclear weapons if you need to make rapid and accurate decisions.

In particular, in 2002, previously unknown details of the acute phase of the crisis were published. On October 27, 1962, on the last day of the acute phase, a group of 11 destroyers of the US Navy and the Randolph aircraft carrier discovered and forced to emerge near Cuba Soviet submarine B-59. During the incident, the boat was fired by the American aircraft and deep bombs were applied against it. The problem was that the B-59 was equipped with nuclear torpedoes, which she had the right to apply on the enemy in a critical situation.

The captain of the B-59 in a difficult situation chose, deciding that he had already started a big war, and gave a team to prepare for the launch of nuclear torpedo on aircraft carrier. The situation of the headquarters of the 69th Brigade of submarines of the Northern Fleet of Vasily Arkhipov, who was elders on board and convinced the commander not to do this, and emerge and wait for instructions from Moscow. In 2002, at a conference dedicated to the 40th anniversary of the Crisis, the former US Defense Minister Robert McNamara, who led the Office in 1961-1968, said that «the nuclear war was much closer to his beginning than previously thought.» To the explanation of the words McNamara, one of the organizers of the conference added that the «Guy on the name of the archups saved the world.»

The first strike dilemma

The modern nuclear doctrine of the United States appeared as a result of research by John Nash and Thomas Schelling in the field of game theory — a special field of mathematics, whose calculations were transferred to the realities of a possible nuclear conflict. «We played in gladies, and, in my opinion, the opponent blinked» — this is exactly the US Secretary of State Dean Sberry described the action of the United States at the peak of the Caribbean crisis. In fact, of course, at the time of the Caribbean crisis, «Boe», and the care of Soviet missiles from Cuba had to exchange the PGM-19 Nuclear Rockets from the US Federal Asian Turkey on the secret conclusion. But this is the principle of the classical game theory — in almost any confrontation of more or less equal opponents, they have no unambiguous «victories» or «lesions», but there is a complex set of acquisitions and losses.

The USSR simply became in all aspects of the military confrontation to catch up with the United States, and in nuclear weapons and achieved almost complete parity. In the theory of games, this means that the matrix of victories and lesions becomes almost symmetrical — none of the parties has a definitely advantageous strategy of the confrontation, after which it moves to cooperation.

In the theory of games, collaboration strategy usually bears less benefit, however, and removes deaths. At the same time, no first blow, even the most massive or spent with the help of rockets close to the opponent, does not save — another player still remains strong moves that make the conflict victory is weakly distinguishable from defeat. It turns out that there is no winnings in the conflict — the farther both sides enter the path of escalation, the worse. And it is possible to «blink» so that the half-water is then not to get out of the ashes.

This forced transformation can be traced in the practice of US policy applications. In 1961, when joining his post, the US Secretary of Defense Minister Robert McNamara used us to use the term «guaranteed destruction» — according to him, then the United States had the opportunity to determine the deaths of the USSR by the first nuclear strike. This statement McNamara was by no means unique: immediately after the end of World War II, the United States decided to intensively increase nuclear forces for a possible nuclear strike in the USSR. US President Duight Eisenhuer smelledly called this approach to «massive retribution», implying that the United States will apply a massive nuclear strike even in response to conflict with the use of ordinary weapons.

However, by the end of the stay of McNamara in his post, the term «guaranteed destruction» was unexpectedly supplemented with a very unpleasant word for the United States: «mutual guaranteed destruction.» It became clear that the USSR would be able to apply the same fatal blow to the United States even after the disarming first nuclear strike. As a result, such «guaranteed destruction» had to be in urgency to refuse, replacing the term that became dangerous, the term is a little different — «nuclear deterrence».

However, in the framework of the game theory, this term is even more appropriate — in the case of an equal opponent, the key strategy looks different. Knowing that the destructive return of the enemy is inevitable, the parties in every way avoid conflict, as this means guaranteed destruction for both.

However, such logic does not act with weak opponents. In the case of the same North Korea, the USA has yet been the real opportunities to «play in a plus», although, of course, even the destruction of 20-60 nuclear fuel charges of the DPRK looks not a trivial task. In the same way, the US is still the possibility of the first strike on the «threshold» Iran — the benefit of Iranians have a «nuclear lego», from which they can collect a real nuclear bomb in a rather short time. But Tehran even has no delivery tools that can hit the territory of the United States, in contrast to the powerful rockets of the DPRK.

It is in such a logic that the current military nuclear doctrine of the United States is prescribed, adopted in 2018 by Donald Trump. It says that China, Russia, DPRK, Iran, and the ongoing activity of terrorist groups are the key opponents of the United States. In a clear way, with the help of nuclear weapons, the US want to fight with the first four opponents, but to do it in different ways. In the case of Russia and China, as in the past, we are talking about «nuclear deterrence». But for the case of the DPRK and Iran, another — the United States «reserves the right to» apply against North Korea and Iran «all available measures». Under which, obviously, the use of the first nuclear weapons is also assumed.

Apparently, expensive modern American developments of missile defense systems (pro), which are clearly unable to protect Washington from the counter strike of Russia or China, may be useful to US only as an incomplete protection against a weakened response strike of these countries — or for full leveling Modest possibilities of response hit by the DPRK and Iran. The same tasks are indirectly served and exit from DRSMD — with the help of rockets with a small downtown, you can easily be degraded by the Iranian or DPRK guide as part of the first disarming strike.

Hence the concerns of scientists from Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, which were associated with China, France and India in the 1960-1970s, and today they are concentrated around the US output from DRSMD and the possibilities of DPRK and Iran in a part of nuclear weapons. The most unpleasant scenario of the world apocalypse is a quick rocket crisis near Iran’s borders or North Korea, if the United States decides to play upon «victory». It was in such a trap of the United States almost in 1962, erroneously believing that the USSR «definitely blinks» and certainly passed the position. The United States perceives North Korea and the United States as obviously losers and defenseless — and from this point of view, nuclear weapons can be applied against these countries.

The awareness of the insane risk in which the whole world was staying when we see, it came to Robert McNamar only postfactum, in many years after the end of the Caribbean crisis. And I want to believe that today Washington is enough to have a mind not to put the world on the edge of the nuclear war again, even if all mathematical calculations will speak the United States: «The case is faithful, no response will be.» Because in real life, in contrast to the theory of games, there are always responses. Even y, seemingly weak opponents.